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Abstract— Ethical issues raised by the idea of social robots that
care point at a fundamental difference between man and machine.
What sort of “difference” is this? We propose a semiotic view on
technology to clarify the relations users have with social robots.
Are these autonomous agents just promising or can we also count
on them?
1. INTRODUCTION
If a “smart” coffee machine knows about its user’s heart
problems, should it accept giving him a coffee when he
requests one? The issue is raised in “Ethical Things” a
project that “explores the effects of autonomous systems
of the future.”1 Similar ethical issues raised by the idea of
autonomous care robots were discussed in the Accompany
project, one of the many EU projects in the field of social
robotics for elderly care.2.[1].
Social robots challenge our traditional theories of moral
responsibility. Are they moral agents? Can they be held
responsible? In this short note I invite the reader to take a
look behind these type of ethical issues raised by the growing
autonomy of our intelligent technical artifacts of which
the social robots are the most impressive representatives.
Can we perceive robots as social responsible autonomous
companion agents that care and at the same time as technical
instruments? How can we understand social robots from the
principles of technology? And what do users that report
about their interactions with social robots tell us about the
limitations of technology that follow from these principles?
2. ROBOT ETHICS AND ETHICAL ROBOTS
People have different views on the moral issues raised by
autonomous artifacts like robots and what they mean for their
application in for example health care practice. Implicit in
these views is an idea about what technology can accomplish
which is based on ideas about what technology is, about the
relation between mind and matter in men and in the machine.
The emphasis in the usual approach in robot ethics research
is “on the robot and what the robot really is or thinks‘’,
in order to be able to answer questions like “Are robots
intelligent, rational, ‘moral agents’?” or “it limits ethics to
concerns about things that might go wrong in interactions
with robots.” “For many moral philosophers, ethics is about
holding someone responsible and about the rightness of one’s
actions, and then questions regarding moral status and action
1http://www.creativeapplications.net/objects/ethical-things-the-mundane-
the-insignificant-and-the-smart-things/
2In Accompany a robotic companion was developed for providing ser-
vices to elderly users in a motivating and socially acceptable manner to
facilitate independent living at home. (http://accompanyproject.eu/
are central. We usually ascribe moral responsibility only
to beings that have a sufficient degree of moral agency -
whatever that means- and ask about the rightness of what
that agent does, has done, or could do.” [2]. Coeckelberg
proposes a human centric or interaction centric approach to
the ethics of robot technology. “Instead of a philosophy of
mind concerning what robots really are or really (can) think,
let us turn to a philosophy of interaction and take seriously
the ethical significance of appearance.”([3], p.220).
One of the outcomes of the Accompany focus group dis-
cussions was that control over the programming of the robot
needed to be a negotiation between the older person living
with the robot, and that person’s other support networks of
formal and informal carers, rather than simply implementing
an older person’s wishes. However, the data also suggests
that at least one approach - the ‘let’s do it together’ strategy
may itself undermine autonomy by (unconsciously, perhaps)
infantilising the older person [1].
I will argue that what is needed for ethical decisions is
an open dialogue between partners involved; a dialogue that
takes into account the specific situation in which a decision
has to be made. Ethical issues are raised when we become
aware of a conflict between general rules of good conduct,
between different values, autonomy and safety for example.
“Open” means that there is no protocol that is forced upon
the dialogue partners. A robot would be social when it would
take responsibility, not because it is ascribed responsibility.
Someone who is just following a procedure, as computers
and clergymen do, is not responsible since he does not at
the same time reflect critically on the appropriateness of the
procedure, a reflection that should be based on sensitivity
for the values that are important in the particular situation
at hand. Sometimes we must leave things for others to do.
Trust is okay, but not blind trust. Responsibility is a virtue,
not a commodity that can be given away.
Moor argues that “explicit ethical robot agents can decide
what to do in a conflict situation.” [4]. But also then we can
only implement general rules. They need to be applied in
a careful way. “The human act of caring is the recognition
of the intrinsic value of each person and the response to
that value” (Schoenhofer). From the patient’s view point
care values are safety, satisfaction, responsiveness to care,
dignity, physical and psychological well-being. Values of
the analytical, empirical scientific view are quite differ-
ent: structurability, reproducability, analysability. For modern
technology we can add computability, programmability. The
designer of (social) technology makes user models and
assumes programmability of the user, who adheres to the
models underlying the user interface of the system. Although
tailoring is a hot topic in the field of intelligent software
agents, from a designers perspective the user remains an
abstract entity. For the care giver the unique person he cares
about is the one who determines what has to be done in a
concrete situation.
3. DIALOGUE AND RESPONSIBILITY
In everyday life we encounter each other as persons.
What makes man a person is his rationality, in the sense of
accountability. The postulate of rationality is a -contrafactual-
principle that partners in a personal dialogue adhere to.
According to Kant being accountable, having the will to
take responsibility, is what characterizes the moral person.
On the contrary, things are those objects that can not take
responsibility3.
Note that ‘man is rational’ is not meant here as an
empirical statement, but a contrafactual postulate. When we
are engaged in a dialogue we must assume that it holds
and we must act accordingly so it becomes reality. This
postulate is constitutive for the dialogue: without this there is
no dialogue between persons possible. Even when someone
lies we assume that he will have an explanation for it. We
have to take seriously that the other says something. This
is the first postulate of dialogue. Being accountable is thus
characteristic for being rational.
What do users’ experiences tell us about the interaction
with artificial companions? Bickmore et al. study long term
relationship between embodied conversational agents and
elderly people [6].“Several participants mentioned that they
could not express themselves completely using the con-
strained interaction. One of them reported: ‘When she ask me
questions ... I can’t ask her back the way I want’. [6]. Clearly,
users of conversational agents experience that a real interac-
tion with the system is not possible. It simulates programmed
“social behaviors” but it lacks social competence. The coffee
machine that knows about its user’s heart problems and that
is confronted with a moral problem: ‘Should I present a
coffee or not?’ could start a dialogue with the user and try
to convince him. Eventually, questions will come up: ‘Who
am I talking to?’ ‘Do you really care?’. The philosopher
tries to understand what this reveals about the very idea
of technology. How does technology work and serve us? A
semiotic approach might help.
4. UNDERSTANDING TECHNOLOGY
For understanding the “difference between man and ma-
chine” it may help if we think about the difference between
the physical sign and the meaning it carries. Machine is “part
3“Person ist dasjenige Subjekt, dessen Handlungen einer Zurechnung
fa¨hig sind. Die moralische Perso¨nlichkeit ist also nichts anderes als die
Freiheit eines vernu¨nftigen Wesens unter moralischen Gesetzen (die psy-
chologische aber bloss das Vermo¨gen, sich der Identita¨t seiner selbst in den
verschiedenen Zusta¨nden seines Daseins bewusst zu werden); woraus dann
folgt, dass eine Person keinen anderen Gesetzen als denen die sie (entweder
allein oder wenigstens zugleich mit anderen) sich selbst gibt, unterworfen
ist.” “Sache ist ein Ding, was keiner Zurechnung fa¨hig ist. Ein jedes Objekt
der freien Willku¨r, welches selbst der Freiheit ermangelt, heisst daher Sache
(res corporalis)”, [5], Einl. IV (III 26 f.)
of” an intelligent relation; without the human intellect it has
no meaning. Just like a sign without a meaning is not a sign.
The physical presentation and its form is on the one hand
arbitrary (there is no intrinsic relation between the meaning
of a word and how the words looks or sounds), on the
other hand it is conventional and historically motivated (to be
understood you need to learn the language of a community).
In the same way machines are outside objectivations of our
intellect. As technical means they mediate between men and
nature. They are based on forces of the physical nature and
on the forces of social psychological nature.
Computers are language machines. Suppose we talk to a
machine and ask “What time is it?” and the machine answers
“It is 2 o’clock in the afternoon.” How does this work? This
works because of the implemented correspondence between
the structure of the physical process that my talking (also) is
and the meaning I express. Natural language is the socially
shared interface we use to express our thoughts, emotions,
commands. By making the machine react to sequences of
tokens specified in a formal system, tokens that we choose
to resemble the words and sentences in our own natural
language, and by making the machine generate sentences
in a situation that satisfies certain felicity conditions we
bring about the user experience of having to do with an
understanding machine. The social robot by uttering some
natural sounds and by showing some natural behaviours
promises to be of our natural kind.
5. CONCLUSION
We propose a semiotic view on modern technology and
understand technological beings essentially as outside ob-
jectivations of our intellectual meaningful relations in social
practices. The semiotic view on modern technology suggests
a conceptual framework for thinking about the moral issues
raised by social robots. It reveals the fundamental limitations
of any technical system however “smart”. It is our respon-
sibility to see these limitations when we use a system. In
thinking about morality in technology we should carefully
distinguish between the general abstract value free technical
ideas and their application in devices used in concrete value
laden situations.
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